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THE "DEFENSIVE SHIELD" OPERATION AS A TURNING POINT IN ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The Israeli-Arab conflict has been part of the political situation in the Middle East for more than a century. That conflict began as violent activities between two communities and became a conventional war during the 1950s, 1960s and the 1970s 1 . At the eve of the new millennium, the most difficult part of the conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian straggle, seemed to be only one step from resolution. Exactly at that point, the "Ebb and Flow" conflict began, and heightened already sensitive issues in both communities. While Israel had an ambiguous strategy at the beginning of the conflict and changed its strategy and its governments during that conflict, the Palestinian Authority, meanwhile, had a clear goal and a well-defined strategy. The "Defensive Shield"
operation, which began on March 30 2002, dramatically changed the results of that conflict.
That change was a direct result of Israel's new strategy and a result of strategic leadership by
Israel's administration. Israel's National Security Strategy
The "Ebb and Flow" conflict, as mentioned above, is part of a long conflict known as the "Israeli-Arab" conflict and has been occurring for more than one hundred years. The best way to understand the "Ebb and Flow" conflict is to analyze it in the context of the history of Israel's national security strategy. By doing that one can better understand the differences between Israel's administrations. In addition to the historical background, national security strategy is one of the fundamental requirements of any country and also one of the main sources on which states base their policy. To deploy a military force effectively, either for defensive or offensive purposes, a state should have a valid national security strategy. . The paradox is that while Israel definitely needs a national security strategy, currently it does not have a valid one. The main reason for the absence of an Israeli national security strategy stems from internal pragmatic and ideological debates regarding these main components: borders, depth and demographic issues. These debates are the main reason for the differences between the first Prime Minister Sharon's administration and the former Prime Minister Barak's administration.
Historical Background
On November 29, 1947, the UN approved the right of the Jewish people in the land of Israel to establish a Jewish state. A few hours after that decision, the Arabs in the land of Israel (or Palestine) and in the countries around Palestine began a war to destroy the emerging state.
On May 15, 1948 , the state of Israel was created, and the result was the beginning of Israel's independence war. The results of that war were: Israel was established as a state and ceasefire borders were put into place between Israel and its neighbors. Another result was that Israel could not afford to lose this conflict since losing a decisive war would be the end of Israel as a state. In addition the newborn country had most of its population within striking distance of its borders. Judah and Samaria (or the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip were not under Israel's control (as well as the Golan Heights and Sinai Desert but these are not part of this paper). That meant that Israel had no depth blurring the distinction between the tactical and strategic levels.
Additionally, Most of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was composed of reserve soldiers.
Moreover, Israel's economy was very weak, the extreme effort, to establish the state and to survive, directed most of the resources towards security concepts. Furthermore, the most alarming outcome of the Israeli war of independence was the understanding that that war was not the last one. It was clear that 1948 war was the first round of war for Israel as a state, and that the Arab neighbors of Israel were going to continue their efforts to destroy Israel.
Consequently, led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in the 1950s, Israeli strategic leaders developed the country's first framework for addressing national security. The background for that strategy was the result of the 1948-49 war: first, Israel's lack of depth required fighting on the enemy's territory, second, an army of reservists and a weak economy compelled Israel to seek a brief decisive war. Finally, the understanding that Israel cannot afford to lose any war prioritized the effort to achieve military superiority against Israel's enemies. The "end" 3 in that strategy was the survival of Israel; the "way" was the offensive doctrine at the operative and tactical levels, and the "means" were using all the resources of Israel to achieve that end: military force, economy, society, policy, and international diplomacy. This national security strategy was based on two main components: quality and blitzkrieg. The quality component required Israel to remain superior qualitatively (the "qualitative edge") to its enemies. would be an Islamic state, the capital would be Jerusalem and the refugee's right to "return" was not negotiable. The major differences between these parties were: in the short term do the Palestinians recognize Israel as a state? And the long term, will the Palestinian state will be secular or religious? Therefore, the will of the Palestinian side of the conflict was at least to establish a state in Judah, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. This state was intended to include East Jerusalem and the refugees would have the right to return to Israel.
The Israeli Internal Debate
Israel is a democracy; therefore, its policies and goals changed as a result of its elections.
The Israeli side of the conflict had an ambiguous goal because of Israel's long internal debate in defining Israel's main interests. Furthermore, that debate divided the people of Israel into three main groups: the leftist ideological parties, the right-wing ideological parties, and the pragmatic parties (that have diverse opinions). The main argument was and still is about the border issue of Judah, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Since various aspects of the debate about Israel's border exist, this paper will explain two approaches: the pragmatic approach and the ideological approach.
The Pragmatic Approach
The Their point is that Judah and Samaria are the heart of biblical Israel, and that giving these lands to anyone does not make religious or Zionist sense. Therefore, Israel should not give any territory to any Arab country or authority.
Since the pragmatic and ideological aspects are mixed and combined, it is difficult to distinguish between the two because every Israeli Jewish citizen, especially the leaders are aware of the tension between these aspects. Actually, one of the reasons that Israel did not make the decision about its borders is that it is extremely difficult to find the best combination between the pragmatic needs and approach and the ideological issues. Therefore, every Israeli government decides what its approach to the borders issue will be. One of the consequences of the borders issue is the national security strategy and the government policy.
Barak's Government Policy
The Barak administration's policy was based on the leftist side of the pragmatic part of Israel's political system, and parts of Barak's coalition were from the ideological Leftists parties. Consequently, Israel's national security strategy maintained that the presence of the IDF and the settlements in Judah, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip were temporary. In addition, the purpose of military activities was to contain any conflict mainly by defensive operations. The main goal was keeping the PA forces in condition so that they could keep the order in the Arab cities in the West Bank and The Gaza Strip. As a result, the Israeli government ignored the flagrant violations of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement by the Palestinians in order to keep the process progressing. Israel's army did not identify the Palestinian police as an enemy, even though they sometimes ignored terror activities that occurred from their territory and sometimes even actively involved. Israel's policy stated that the "Declaration of Principles" agreement was the most important strategic progress for Israel; therefore, Israel should make every effort to succeed in that process.
Barak's era was characterized by optimism. It seemed that Israel and the Palestinian people were at the end of a long and bloody conflict. The mood in Israel was that this time both sides were serious in striving to reach a lasting peace agreement to the conflict forever.
Examining two important facts, however, prove useful for a better understanding that situation. to compel our enemy to do our will" 13 . Very simply, this definition means that there are at least two states or two authorities, or a couple of entities in conflict. Another meaning is that their wills are clear; furthermore, and the main point was that both sides believed that by using force they could enforce their will upon the enemy, or at least protect their own will. While evaluating whether a conflict is a war, looking for these issues proves mandatory.
Clausewitz redefined war in other ways as well: "War is nonetheless a serious means to a serious end" 14 , "War is an act of policy" 15 , and "War is merely is the continuation of policy by other means" 16 . These definitions, however, do not contradict the first definition. When
Clausewitz called war a means, he meant that war was subordinate to an end, or, in other words, war was subordinate to the basic will that the state wanted to compel its enemy to do.
The last definition added that the will was the policy, or that the politicians and not the army were responsible to define the will.
Clausewitz continued and claimed that "at least at first sight, any additional expenditure of absolute. In addition, Clausewitz divided the nation into three sections: the first is the people, the second is the military leader and his army, and the third is the government. This
Clausewitzian triangle created the will of the state or country: how and when to use its army.
It could be understood that Clausewitz defined war as forcing the political object defined by the government upon the enemy. The decision to use force for achieving the goals depended on the relationship between the people, the military, and the government. According to Clausewitz, once there was a decision to use force, the only reasonable decision to suspend the action was to achieve a better military position; otherwise, it was considered absurd.
Is "Ebb and Flow" a War?
As mentioned previously in the definition of war there were at least two sides. In the Therefore, the will of Israel was not clear at the beginning of the conflict. That ambiguous policy meant that at the beginning of the fighting the IDF's main goal was to contain the struggle and to try not to damage the PA. The IDF rules of engagement limited the forces: not to enter into the PA territory and to limit the use of tanks, and other weapon platforms. In other words, the policy was to fight with one hand tied so Israel could go back to the negotiation table as soon as possible. Therefore, at the opening of the conflict, one side used extreme power to compel its will, while the other side used very limited power to try to achieve an ambiguous end. One side started war, according to the Clausewitzian definition, and the other side did something different.
That situation, however, does not fit the Clausewitzian definition of war. Fortunately for Israel, it was strong enough to contain the struggle, but it caused elections. The meaning of elections was that the people from Clausewitz's triangle influenced the system and thereby caused a shift in the government that consequently caused a shift in Israel's will. The new will of Israel was to reduce the terrorist attacks against Israelis to a minimum by limiting the ability of the terrorists to harm Israel's population. In order to impose Israeli will on the PA, the Israeli government gradually increased the power that it used. Going back to the triangle, the people and the government increased their acceptance of the military to compel the Israeli will upon the PA.
The PA triangle at the time produced an opposite result. The government, led by Arafat, thought that Israeli society was weak enough so if the PA used more force they could impose their will upon Israel, basically by forcing Israel to bring international forces into in the conflict 19 .
The PA did not ask its people their opinion, and Arafat was a charismatic leader who created a consensus for his policy, at least for the part of using power against Israel That shift in Israel's strategy was the point that made this conflict a war, according to Clausewitz's definition. There were two different entities that had two opposite wills, and each tried to compel its enemy to do its will. On the Palestinian side it was not clear that all the terrorist organizations were subordinate to the political ends, but it was clear that all the terrorist organizations tried to achieve a common minimum political end which was to establish a Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. On the Israeli side it was clear that the military end was subordinate to the political ends.
Another phenomenon that took place during this war was the high intensity of government involvement. On the Palestinian side, the involvement included sending official forces to participate in terrorist attacks 25 . On the Israeli side, the government was involved by forcing the army to approve almost every mission in the PA territory. That involvement declined during "Defensive Shield" operation, but the Israeli government's involvement was the exact thing that
Clausewitz said was absurd to do. While Clausewitz's perspective could be understood, as a military officer, however, it appears that involvement made the military activity a real continuation of diplomacy by other means. However, creating such a major shift in the Israeli society and especially in the IDF was a big leadership challenge.
The Leadership Challenge
Leadership at the strategic level was challenging in several ways. First, charactering the ambiguities of the strategic environment was challenging. Secondly, defining a vision in an uncertain and changing atmosphere at the strategic level was part of the components that creates that challenge. Thirdly, needing a strategic leader to create a major shift in large parts of motivation is influenced also from society and from the mood of its people. Therefore, a strategic leader in the IDF had to understand and consider the environment in this society when making decisions. Although the leader was not led by public opinion, in order to be more effective, however, the leader should not ignore the mood of the people. As mentioned previously, Barak's era was characterized as an optimistic period that peace was 'around the corner', and that the emerging conflict was an accident. The IDF Chief of Staff (COF) at that time, Gen. Shaul Mofaz, had to find a way to make the shift from a defensive approach 27 towards an offensive approach 28 . This challenge was directed at the Israeli Prime Minister also, but in this paper, the focus is only on the IDF COS leadership.
Another challenge that Gen. Mofaz had was to convince his subordinates and the public that it was possible to go into the Palestinian cities with an acceptable level of casualties. The international experience with fighting inside hostile cites showed that the odds were against the offensive side and that it often costs many casualties (Stalingrad is the most famous example) 29 . Furthermore, the Israeli experience in urban warfare was the same and fresher in the minds of the generals and the public. The experience from the combat in Suez City in 1973
and from the battle in Beirut in 1982-83 showed the complexity and the sacrifice that characterized urban warfare. Therefore, a leader had to make every possible effort to find a solution for the terrorist attacks before raising the option to conquer cities. However, raising the option was not enough. Gen. Mofaz had to convince the army and the public that it was not just a way, but also the way to fight effectively against Palestinian terrorists. To make a shift in public opinion about an argument that was consider impossible in the collective memory or that was going to lead to a catastrophe was indeed a tough leadership challenge.
Another shift that the Chief of Staff had to lead was to build confidence at the tactical level that it could fight in urban areas. The "Ebb and Flow" conflict was not a surprise for the IDF;
nevertheless, in most scenarios, no one really thought about the option of going into the cities in the West Bank
30
. Consequently, the tactical units neglected urban warfare and the idea that the professional ability to fight needed to be improved. The intensity of the conflict stretched the army; hence, the training and drills became on-the-job-training. Furthermore, the situation in the reserve units was worse than in the active army units. The reserve units normally drilled once a year, with little attention to urban warfare training. The confidence of these units regarding their ability to fight in urban areas was not very high. In addition, fighting against terrorist groups was much more difficult than conquering a city. In most cases, the terrorists did not volunteer to show themselves. The professional challenge was objectively high, especially considering the lack of training by the tactical units. The strategic leader, General Mofaz, had to find a way to lead his army to victory, even though there were many difficulties to face.
Therefore the leadership challenge was to transfer the public approach from the filling that the wishful peace was close than ever (or was already here) toward an approach that there was still some way to go before reaching the hopeful peace and there are going to be some fights on that way. The internal challenge was to create the confidence that the IDF had the ability to win in the urban areas.
Leadership and Strategy Leadership
Scholars, leaders, and researchers have been analyzing the leadership phenomenon for decades; therefore, there was more than one definition for leadership. Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan suggested leadership was "realized in the process whereby one or more individuals succeed in attempting to frame and define the reality of other." 31 The three components in this definition 32 included the leader, the others or the group that was led, and the definition of the reality, goal, or vision. Since reality has more than one interpretation succeeding in defining the reality of others, as suggested in this definition, was a complicated mission, especially if, as a result of this interpretation, the led were supposed to do something that they did not want to do or that could endanger their lives. The tension between the leader and his or her followers was and still is inherent in the leadership phenomenon.
That tension increased when leading at the strategic level, since the ambiguity characterized at the strategic level raised doubt that the interpretation given by any leader was the correct interpretation. Smircich and Morgan defined strategic leadership as "...providing a conception and direction for organizational process that goes above and beyond what is embedded in the fabric of organization as a structure, i.e. a reified and somewhat static pattern of meaning." 33 The way that strategic leaders handled tension and the perceived 'correct' interpretation, according to Smircich and Morgan, was by providing a concept and direction toward the future. The leader framed the future of the organization, he or she provided a future concept, and then showed the direction of how to achieve that future goal. If the strategic leaders did this then they would overcome the tension and the complicated reality of arguing about the past and the present. , they did recognize that strategic leadership was about "providing… direction… that goes above and beyond what is embedded in the fabric…" Therefore, the way that Smircich and Morgan suggested to accomplish the goals (or vision) was by managing the meaning. Combining these two articles could result a strategic leader focused in the future. The outcome should be a vision and management of meaning. The vision desired the ideal of the future organization above and beyond the present situation of the organization.
The management of meaning was the ability to lead and to focus human energy to make that vision a reality.
The "Ebb and Flow" Case Study
In the "Ebb and Flow" case study, the three components of leadership were easily distinguished: the leader (Chief of Staff), the followers (his direct subordinates and the entire Army), and the reality that should have been interpreted was the Israeli -PA conflict. The potential tension between the leader and his followers was there as mentioned in the leadership challenge above. The result of a vision, any vision, that the COS would have decided would have caused some of his followers to risk their lives and some to deny his interpretation.
Furthermore, trying to define a vision in complex circumstances as it was in those days was a more challenging task. What was the ideal and unique future, if any, that he wanted to attain? In addition, the ability to manage the meaning was complicated because of the poor reputation that urban warfare had and the lack of training in that particular warfare. The combination of all the above circumstances caused a major leadership challenge to Gen. Mofaz.
The Chief of Staff's vision was to attack the terrorist groups wherever they were. That meant to change the strategy of the army from a defensive to an offensive mode. Moreover, the result was that the IDF should prepare to conquer the Palestinian Cities.
Gen. Mofaz's Methods
The main method of Gen. Mofaz was to declare that Israel would fight against terrorism in every place that it existed. Gradually he gave more details about his vision that Palestinian cities would have to be attacked with ground forces. By doing that, the IDF COS reduced the criticism of his vision. Gen. Mofaz moreover, showed evidence to the media that the leaders of terrorist groups roamed freely in the PA territory, and that the PA was an active participant in terrorist activities. By showing that, he presented the option of invading PA cities to the public.
Consequently, the IDF monitored activity in the nearby PA cities and gradually reduced the territory of the PA 36 . This method was part of "managing the meaning" of the civilian population.
The method that Gen. Mofaz used to "manage the meaning" of the military part was subordinates. More than once he discovered that leaders at the tactical level were much more confident with the mission than the leaders at the operative level, and that the tactical commanders thought that their units were adapted for urban warfare. The next step was sending the active army infantry units into the PA cities and into the refugee camps. These successful attempts showed that the IDF had the ability to be engaged in urban warfare, and that even though the history of urban warfare was considered catastrophic under these circumstances; the IDF could and would succeed.
The most effective combination of vision and "management of meaning" was the "Defensive Shield" operation, which was actually a war between Israel and the PA. The IDF conquered the PA cities within that operation and the Israeli forces that participated in that operation included active army and reserve units. The fact that more than a hundred percent 38 of the soldiers in the reserve units reported for duty showed that the people and the army had indeed made the transition that Gen. Mofaz tried to achieve. Even though it caused a massive entrance into urban hostile areas, the public and COS subordinates followed the vision of attacking terrorism in every place that it existed.
"Defensive Shield" Operation as a Turning Point
The "Defensive Shield" operation was, without doubt, the turning point of the "Ebb and Israel's new strategy was therefore a different interpretation for the concept of peace.
Peace was now divided into at least two parts: security and other aspects. This was the reason why P.M. Sharon did not talk about his long-term program when he was first elected. According to the unilateral approach, Israel would take actions to promote its interests with or without coordination with the Palestinians. The "Defensive Shield" operation, the fence and the evacuation from The Gaza Strip were results of this policy. The "Defensive Shield" operation was the de facto turning point. When Israel's active duty and reserve units entered into the Palestinian cities, the shift in the Israeli policy became a reality.
Conclusion
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict had been continuing for more than a century. Israel had been changing its strategy numerous times during its fifty-seven-year of existence. Ben-Gurion's strategy was based on two fundamental components, quality and blitzkrieg, and that strategy was valid until the Six Day War. After the major changes in reality, Israel had an ambiguous strategy about the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The reason for the ambiguous strategy was the internal Israeli debate about considering the status of these territories. The
Oslo agreements led by P.M. Rabin and followed by Barak's policy tried to end that conflict by negotiating between equal entities. Their policy did not succeed, however, and the violent war 6 That conflict will be analyzed on page 7 The Israeli army prepared to the conflict before the summit and during the summit. The IDF knew that Arafat wanted to establish the Palestinian state as a result of war so they could claim victory upon Israel instead of getting a state as a present. 28 That accident was on purpose, we need to fight against the terrorist groups and leaders. 29 Stalingrad is an example for the damage that relatively small force can cause much greater force in urban area. The famous battle was in WWII between the Russian -defendingand the Vermacht. 30 The scenarios were at the 'peace era" 31 37 This is my personal experience as a battalion commander at that period of time. 38 Israeli reserve units are arranged with "overstrength" personal members so that when mobilized it is technically possible to achieve over 100 percent mobilization. 39 Exhibit 1. From the IDF web site. 40 The Palestinian government building in Rammalah. 41 Exhibit 2. From the IDF web site.
